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Migrant networks are an important catalyst for promoting FDI flows 
between countries. Migrants also send increasingly large remittances to 
their home countries. This paper considers how these two capital flows are 
related, specifically examining how remittance flows respond to the amount 
of FDI inflows to a country. Using a panel of 118 countries over 1980-2010, 
we estimate a random effects model and find a positive and significant 
effect of FDI flows on remittances, while controlling for other standard 
determinants of remittance flows. We account for the potential endogeneity 
of FDI to remittances by utilizing a two-stage Instrumental Variables 
approach. These findings suggest that FDI complements remittances, rather 
than crowding out emigrant investment to the home countries. We find the 
relationship is strongest for low income countries, highlighting the 
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1. Introduction 
Remittances to developing countries in 2013 totaled an estimated $404 billion (World 
Bank, 2015). This amount is equivalent to roughly three times the amount dispersed in official 
development assistance and approximately two-thirds the amount of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows to developing countries.  In some countries, remittances represent the largest single 
source of foreign exchange (World Bank, 2015). Remittances have been widely regarded as a 
potential source for development financing because they are direct transfers to households and 
tend to be more stable than other capital flows (Ratha, 2003). While the size of remittance flows 
depend on migrant networks abroad, such networks have also been shown to stimulate other forms 
of international capital flows, in particular FDI (Javorcik et al., 2011; DeSimone and Manchin, 
2012).  Thus, we might expect FDI and remittances to be complementary in nature, providing 
development finance for those countries sending the largest number of migrants abroad.  By 
contrast, remittances and FDI may compete for investment opportunities, leading migrants to 
reduce their remittances in the face of greater FDI flows. Despite a growing literature into the 
causes and effects of remittances, relatively little research has considered the relationship between 
remittances and FDI. 
We explore the relationship between remittances and FDI on a panel of 118 countries over 
1980-2010 using a random effects Instrumental Variable (IV) model.  Utilizing the well-
established literature on the determinants of remittances, we focus on how aggregate FDI inflows 
impact the amount of aggregate remittance inflows, both measured as a percentage of GDP.  Our 
primary goal is to establish whether FDI and remittances tend to complement or substitute each 
other as alternative forms of international capital.  At the heart of this question is whether foreign 
investors and migrants are following the same investment opportunities (complements), FDI is 
creating additional investment opportunities for migrant investors (complements), or FDI is 
crowding out remittances (substitutes).  Taking into account different income levels of countries, 
we aim to understand the relationship between the two flows, since policies directed toward 
attracting FDI may also affect remittances. If remittances and FDI are substitutes, then increases 
in FDI may crowd out remittances, potentially adversely impacting the home country and its 
prospects for growth. In such a case, policy makers with a desire to increase domestic investment 
would be better served by policies designed to increase local access to investment capital. If, on 
the other hand, remittances and FDI are complements, then policies designed to improve the 
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investment climate and to create opportunities in the domestic economy can attract both FDI and 
remittances. From a development perspective, channeling migrant earnings toward investment 
(either directly toward domestic investment or via FDI flows) may represent the best path for such 
earnings to have a positive impact on the receiving economy.   
While remittances and FDI both represent sources of investment capital, remittances are 
also used for other purposes by recipient households. This characteristic of remittances makes the 
relationship between remittances and FDI quite complex; in particular, causality may run in either 
direction. We explore this possibility by first conducting a Granger causality test, which confirms 
that causality may run in both directions, but with stronger results in the direction from FDI to 
remittances rather than vice versa.  Thus, we utilize a specification with remittances as the 
dependent variable, and include a standard set of control variables that others have found to be 
important determinants of the size of remittance flows across countries.  Importantly, however, we 
recognize that endogeneity in the form of reverse causality is a concern.  Consequently, we 
estimate a two-stage IV model using lagged values of FDI inflows as instruments.  We further 
control for other factors, such as the stock of migrants abroad and the level of GDP, that may be 
important determinants of both FDI and remittances.  As an alternative capital flow, we also 
explore how aid may impact the relationship between FDI and remittances. By contrast to 
remittances, official development assistance is disbursed to governments rather than directly to 
individuals.  Further, aid is only received by a subset of countries and may respond more to 
political considerations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) than to migrant networks abroad. Thus, we 
focus first on the FDI and remittance link before introducing aid into the analysis. 
Generally, we find a positive relationship between FDI and remittance flows, indicating a 
complementarity between the two. We find the relationship is strongest for low income countries, 
highlighting the importance of remittances as a source of investment capital in these countries. 
Thus, remittances may provide a mechanism through which emigrants can capitalize on market 
opportunities in their home countries. 
In the next Section, we describe the previous literature on the motivations to remit, which 
we use to describe the circumstances under which FDI and remittances are expected to be 
complements or substitutes.  We provide arguments as to why remittances may respond to FDI 
flows, rather than FDI responding to remittances. In section 3, we develop the empirical approach 
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and describe the data. Section 4 contains the main results and discussion with concluding remarks 
and policy considerations in Section 5. 
2. Motivations to remit and relationship between remittances and FDI 
Our primary question in this study is whether inward FDI to a country attracts remittance 
flows or acts as a substitute capital flow.  Due to the nature of remittances and their relationship 
with FDI, however, this is a complex empirical question. First, since remittances have multiple 
uses (e.g., consumption versus investment), changes in FDI might affect remittances directed for 
different purposes in opposite directions. Second, some of the variables that influence remittances 
also influence FDI. In particular, migrant networks are an important catalyst for FDI flows 
(Javorcik et al., 2011; De Simone and Manchin, 2012). At the same time, the stock of migrants 
abroad is a key determinant of remittance flows (Freund and Spatafora, 2008). Third, causality 
between remittances and FDI may run in either direction. Larger FDI flows may crowd out 
emigrant investment in the home country as captured by remittance flows.  Alternatively, such 
flows may be complementary in nature, as FDI investment spurs on economic growth, leading to 
emigrants sending larger remittances to take advantage of additional investment opportunities at 
home.  In this case, migrants may follow the lead of the international investment community and 
channel their own funds toward investment opportunities in their home countries.  In this section, 
we discuss the previous literature as it relates to the relationships mentioned above, and make 
several arguments for how FDI can impact remittance flows. Ex ante, the direction of the 
relationship is unclear, with potentially countervailing impacts depending on the motivations 
driving remittances. 
In terms of the motivations to remit, unlike FDI inflows, remittances are not necessarily 
determined by a profit motive. Lucas and Stark (1985) outline three potential motivations for 
sending remittances: pure altruism, pure self-interest, and tempered altruism or enlightened self-
interest. Remittances based on pure altruism are typically linked to increased consumption 
expenditures of receiving households. Remittances based on self-interest of the migrant are more 
likely to be linked to domestic investment or saving behavior. Tempered altruism or enlightened 
self-interest lies somewhere between the two. For instance, a migrant may send remittances to 
increase family members’ consumption (altruistic), with the underlying motivation being that they 
wish to maintain a good reputation in the community should they decide to eventually return home 
(self-interest). Subsequent empirical research has found evidence of all three motivations under 
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varying circumstances. 1   Here, we are particularly concerned with the relationship between 
remittances and investment, where the self-interest motive prevails.  Remittances that have some 
investment motive are also more likely to be impacted by FDI flows. 
Numerous studies have explored the extent to which remittances are invested by receiving 
households. Microeconomic studies have found that remittances are used to increase land holdings, 
purchase livestock, and invest in small businesses (Adams, 1998; Wouterse and Taylor, 2008; 
Yang, 2008; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). Macroeconomic studies exploring the relationship 
between remittances and economic growth have found remittances to be pro-cyclical in countries 
with low levels of financial development (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Mundaca, 2009). The 
fact that remittance inflows increase during periods of economic growth may indicate that 
remittances are being channeled toward investment in the absence of formal credit markets, thus 
overcoming liquidity constraints. Microeconomic evidence also supports this claim. Coon (2014) 
matches household survey data with community-level financial development indicators and finds 
that Mexican households in communities without banks are significantly more likely to use 
remittances for asset accumulation and to invest in productive activities. 
Increases in FDI can serve as a signal or provide validation that investment opportunities 
are on the rise. In response, migrants may send additional remittances to take advantage of such 
investment opportunities. Policy briefs by Terrazas (2010) and Rodriguez-Montemayor (2012) 
explore such “Diaspora Direct Investment” (DDI) and the ways in which it may be more desirable 
than other investment inflows. Emigrants investing in their home countries often have country-
specific knowledge relating to culture and business climate that may make their ventures more 
successful than similar projects led by foreign investors. Also, since they have a sentimental 
attachment to their home countries, they may be less inclined to disinvest during economic 
downturns, which can help reduce economic instability. Although Terrazas (2010) and Rodriquez-
Montemayor (2012) provide descriptive examples of the types of DDI that occur, data limitations 
make it difficult to measure the extent to which DDI occurs.  Rather than capturing a direct link in 
which migrants directly invest via FDI while also sending remittances, which may be used for 
consumption or investment purposes, we explore how these flows are related in an aggregate sense.  
                                                 
1 Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007) provide a comprehensive review. 
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While some FDI may be coming directly from migrants, it is more likely that their role is an 
informational one.   
Previous literature has shown that migration and FDI are positively related. In a study that 
accounts for the endogeneity of FDI to migrant stocks, Javorcik et al. (2011) show that previous 
emigration from a particular country to the US is positively related to FDI flows from the US to 
that country.  De Simone and Manchin (2012) provide evidence of a similar relationship between 
the EU-15 countries (as the migration host countries) and Eastern European countries as the 
migrant origin and FDI recipient countries, emphasizing the privately held knowledge that 
immigrants convey to networks in the host country.  Leblang (2010) shows a similar result using 
a broader range of source and destination countries, with both portfolio capital flows and FDI 
responding positively to the number of migrants from those countries. Kugler et al. (2013) use a 
gravity model framework to show that migration stimulates bilateral financial flows, with an 
emphasis on cross-border loans. This previous literature argues that migrants stimulate financial 
flows by reducing information asymmetries across borders, leading to lower communication and 
transaction costs. As such, this literature largely portrays migrants as facilitators to FDI, opening 
the channel for others to take advantage of market opportunities in their countries of origin.  
Consequently, we attempt to capture whether inward FDI flows crowd out or attract 
remittances from abroad, focusing on aggregate FDI and remittance flows to the home country.  
There are a number of ways in which FDI could crowd out (substitute for) remittances. To the 
extent that remittances are used for investment, FDI may prove to be a cheaper and more efficient 
method of financing investment. While remittances may be used in the absence of other means of 
financing investment, if FDI becomes more available, it can take the place of remittance flows for 
investment.  Similarly, if remittances are being used to overcome capital constraints (as in e.g., 
Coon, 2014), FDI inflows may relieve those constraints, thereby reducing the flow of remittances.2  
FDI may also improve growth opportunities in the home country (as in Borensztein, et al. 1998), 
leading to increases in GDP.3  In such a case, remittances would be less necessary for consumption 
                                                 
2 Rather than remittances being used to overcome liquidity constraints, Clemens and Ogden (2014) argue 
instead that migration is more likely to arise due to a lack of investment opportunities in the home 
community, and migration represents the most profitable use of household resources. 
3 Note that Borensztein et al. (1998) show that the FDI-growth link requires a country to have sufficient 
human capital to take advantage of the technology transfers inherent in FDI flows.  Alfaro et al. (2004) 
further show that domestic financial development is important for FDI to have growth impacts.    
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purposes, and remittances would fall as FDI enters the country.  Similarly, if remittances are 
compensatory in nature (i.e., related to the altruistic motive to remit), an increase in employment 
and income associated with an increase in FDI would reduce the demand for remittances. 
There are also several channels through which FDI is expected to attract (complement) 
remittance flows. First, FDI creates linkage effects between domestic suppliers and foreign firms 
(Markusen and Venables, 1999). Forward and backward linkages created by FDI lead to 
investment opportunities for domestic producers. 4  If investments are being financed through 
remittances, this will induce migrants to remit at a higher rate in order to seize upon these 
opportunities. Similarly, increases in employment and wages created by FDI will increase 
domestic demand for goods and services in other industries, and hence, investment opportunities. 
Thus, while FDI-led growth may lead to a reduction in remittances for consumption purposes, it 
may increase remittances for investment purposes.  Taken together, the net effect of FDI on 
aggregate remittance inflows is, ex ante, unknown. Hence, we leave it to an empirical exercise to 
determine whether FDI and remittances are complements or substitutes.  Previous literature 
provides mixed results. 
In one of the few studies to consider correlations between remittances and other capital 
flows, Buch and Kuckulenz (2010) find no significant relationship between remittances and private 
capital inflows for 87 developing countries between 1970 and 2000.5 They do find, however, a 
positive correlation between remittances and official capital inflows. They empirically examine 
the determinants of each of these three individual capital flows separately: remittances, private 
capital flows, and official development assistance. However, they exclude the alternative flows in 
                                                 
4 Jordaan (2011) suggests that the backward linkages between foreign and domestic firms may be larger 
than previously assumed in the FDI literature, thus indicating that FDI provides positive externalities for 
local suppliers, leading to better domestic growth opportunities overall. 
5 Within the growing literature on the relationship between remittances and capital flows, the majority of 
these papers explore the flows’ impact on some other variable. Hossain (2014) examines the extent to 
which both FDI and remittances impact domestic savings rates, showing that remittances tend to displace 
domestic savings. Wang and Wong (2011) examine how inward FDI and remittances affect out-
migration. While they find that FDI reduces out-migration among the more educated population, their 
study stops short of exploring how that might affect future remittance streams.  Nwaogu and Ryan (2015) 
examine the impact of FDI, foreign aid, and remittances on economic growth in developing countries of 
Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean but do not examine how the different capital flows may affect 
each other.  Others (e.g., Selaya and Sunesen, 2012) focus on the relationship between aid and FDI, but 
leave out any consideration of remittances. 
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the set of possible determinants for each. Thus, it is unclear whether and how one flow is affecting 
the others.   
Two papers focus on how remittances impact FDI. Basnet and Upadhyaya (2014) 
hypothesize that remittances lead to increases in human capital, which in turn attracts FDI. Their 
results, however, show that remittances do not tend to drive FDI flows. On their sample of 35 
middle-income countries between 1980 and 2010, they find no significant effect of lagged 
remittances on FDI. Garcia-Fuentes et al. (2016) argue that remittances encourage FDI by 
increasing domestic consumption, including goods and services produced by foreign firms. They 
find that remittances positively impact FDI flows from the US to Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. However, the sign of the relationship depends on the income of the recipient country, 
with a negative effect in low-income countries and a positive effect in high-income countries. 
Mallaye and Yogo (2011) examine the relationship between FDI, aid, and remittances but only 
focus on a panel of 33 “fragile states” over the period between 1995 and 2008. In a framework 
similar to ours, they show that FDI complements remittances while aid substitutes for remittances. 
We take this question further by focusing on the relationship between FDI and remittances, while 
also taking account of official capital flows, for a larger set of countries across the income 
spectrum. 
Recognizing the complexity of the relationship between remittances, FDI, and other capital 
flows, we take seriously the possibility that FDI may respond to prior migration and to the amount 
of remittance flows. Consequently, we first consider the direction of causality between FDI and 
remittances using Granger causality tests. We then examine the relationship between these two 
capital flows by explicitly modeling the impact of FDI flows on remittance flows. We also ask 
how official development assistance may impact remittances. Importantly, adding aid flows to our 
regressions does little to change the relationship between FDI flows and remittances. Thus, while 
we consider the role of official development assistance, we find that the important relationship is 
between remittances and FDI. 
3. Empirical Approach and Data 
Our primary question of interest is whether aggregate inward FDI flows and inward 
remittance flows are related for country i. To get at this question, we employ an unbalanced panel 
of 118 countries for the years 1980-2010 to estimate the following model 
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    =    +          +             + Γ      + ΦΧ   +      +        (1) 
where     is the log of remittances received by country   as a percentage of GDP in year  . FDI is 
the log of net FDI inflows to country i in year t as a share of GDP.  Emigrant is the emigrant stock 
in country i as a share of the population, measured at the beginning of each decade. Z is a vector 
of variables related to the degree of openness of each country and is measured by trade and 
financial openness.  We include lagged measures of capital account and trade openness since 
remittances are likely to be affected by the ability to send both capital and goods across borders. 
Χ   is a vector of additional control variables that have been shown by previous literature to be the 
primary determinants of remittances. Several studies have examined the macroeconomic 
determinants of remittance flows, primarily to explore the extent to which domestic 
macroeconomic policy can increase the inward flow of remittance income. We use this previous 
literature to specify the baseline determinants of remittances, which we use as control variables to 
capture the marginal impact of FDI inflows on remittances.  Our main set of determinants (Χ  ) of 
remittance flows include measures of home and host country income (Freund and Spatafora, 2008; 
Adenutsi, 2014), as well as human capital and age dependency (Buch and Kuckulenz, 2010), 
political stability (Adams, 2009), and the level of financial development (Guiliano and Ruiz-
Arranz, 2009; Mundaca, 2009) in the country of origin.6  Our model also includes an error term, 
   , and a random effect,   , specific to country  . Thus, this model extends the previous literature 
to focus on the role that FDI inflows play in encouraging or discouraging remittance inflows. 
 Prior studies have shown that migrant networks encourage FDI (e.g., De Simone and 
Manchin, 2012; Javorcik et al., 2011; Leblang, 2010). Migrant networks are also highly correlated 
with remittances and are a significant determinant in studies that examine remittances (e.g., Freund 
and Spatafora, 2008).  In the analysis below we control for emigrant stock. We find this to be an 
important predictor of remittance flows into source countries, but not FDI inflows (as seen in the 
                                                 
6 Others have also considered money supply (Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006) and interest rate 
differentials (El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Aydas et al., 2005) but these do not appear to be the main 
determinants. We also considered the effects of the real exchange rate on remittances (Alleyne et al., 
2008; Adenutsi, 2014).  Those results show that remittances are negatively related to the real effective 
exchange rate. As the home country faces real currency appreciation, emigrants send less since their 
remittances lose value in the home country. Inclusion of this control variable, however, resulted in a loss 
of approximately half of our observations but did not significantly alter the relationship between FDI and 
remittances. Thus, we present findings without the real exchange rate included, even though the exchange 
rate could certainly impact the timing and size of remittances. These results are available upon request. 
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first-stage results, Table 4b). This is likely because migrant network effects found in previous 
research are for specific country-to-country corridors, whereas we use aggregate measures of 
emigrant stock and FDI.  Garcia-Fuentes et al. (2016) show that in certain cases remittances can 
lead to increases in FDI.  Thus, we must first establish that causality runs from FDI to remittances 
before we can place remittances as the dependent variable. To identify the direction of causality, 
we employ a Granger (1969) style causality test utilizing the following VAR framework adapted 
to a panel setting as proposed by Holtz-Eakin, et al. (1988): 
 { , } =    + ∑    { ,   } 
 
    + ∑      { ,   } +   , 
 
                   (2) 
and 
   { , } =    + ∑      { ,   } 
 
    + ∑    { ,   } +   , 
 
                (3) 
We can establish causality by rejecting the null hypothesis that causality is not present if 
  :    = 0, ∀   = 1, … ,                  (4) 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that for at least one value of  , 
  :    ≠ 0 .                 (5) 
As we show below, these Granger causality tests indicate that we can reject the null of non-
causality for both Equations (2) and (3).  Thus, causality appears to run both from FDI to 
remittances, and from remittances to FDI. We find, however, a larger R-squared on those 
regressions in which FDI impacts remittances. Consequently, we specify the empirical model such 
that remittances are considered the dependent variable.  Importantly, however, we must control for 
endogeneity due to the potential for reverse causality.  We also control for a variety of other factors, 
some of which may impact both FDI and remittances, and examine these using the two-stage 
approach. 
We estimate the model in equation (1) first using a random effect GLS model as a baseline. 
We then control for the endogeneity of FDI to remittances by estimating a two-stage IV model 
using lagged values of FDI inflows as instruments. Recognizing that capital flows may also be 
related to GDP, we also estimate a model controlling for potential endogeneity of both FDI and 
GDP. The results are robust to these specification changes. Additionally, we provide specification 
test results below, indicating that the random effects model is appropriate and that the instruments 
used are valid. 
Data for this study are collected from several sources. Data for remittances and emigrant 
stocks are taken from the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Fact Book (2011). Our 
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measure of capital account openness is the KAOPEN index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). 
Human capital data are from Barro and Lee (2013). Our measure of political stability comes from 
the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions database (Marshall, 2016). 
All remaining data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2012). 
 Remittances to country i (    ) comprise the primary focus of the regression analysis. 
Aggregate remittance inflows to each country i over each year are reported in dollars. To be able 
to compare the magnitude of flows across countries, we normalize remittance flows as a share of 
GDP.7 
Our key explanatory variable consists of the FDI inflows that country i receives from the 
rest of the world. Net inflows of FDI are calculated as FDI inflows to country i (i.e., net inward 
direct investment from the rest of the world to country i). We are interested in how much FDI is 
flowing into the country and thus we do not account for FDI outflows (i.e., outward direct 
investment from country i). Yet, the net FDI inflows variable may be negative, which can be 
described as the reversal of previous flows. To account for negative values of FDI we take the log 
of the absolute value of net FDI inflows and use the negative of this value for any observation with 
FDI<0.8  
One of the primary determinants of remittances is the number of migrants from country i 
that live abroad. The accumulated emigrant stock, denoted           above, is measured as the 
number of people at the end of the year that have migrated abroad from country i. We normalize 
the emigrant stock by measuring it as a share of the population. The emigrant stock data are only 
available on a decennial basis. Thus, our measure of emigrant stock as a share of the population is 
taken at the beginning of each decade, i.e.          ,     =          ,     = ⋯ =
         ,     . The lagged nature of this variable may mitigate concerns regarding the 
correlation of prior migration and FDI in the regression equation. Note that each of these key 
variables is an aggregate measure for country i, so that the emigrant stock may be located in any 
number of host countries. Similarly, the net FDI inflows and remittance flows may be coming from 
any country into country i. 
                                                 
7 Since remittances and FDI both tend to grow over time in levels, normalizing these variables to shares 
of GDP has the added benefit that they are each stationary in this form. Normalizing these variables 
instead as per capita measures (as in Adams, 2009) provides similar results. 
8 We also run the model using just the log of positive values of net FDI inflows, with similar results 
overall. 
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Openness to international trade and financial flows can impact both FDI and remittances.  
The ability to send financial capital across borders is given by capital account openness as 
measured by the Chinn and Ito (2006) KAOPEN measure. Trade openness is calculated as exports 
plus imports relative to GDP and serves as a general measure of a country’s openness. Capital 
account openness and trade openness are expected to be positively related to remittances as the 
flow of funds may be less restricted under higher openness measures. We use one-period lagged 
values of the openness measures.   
Following the previous literature on remittances (e.g., Freund and Spatafora, 2008; 
Adenutsi, 2014), the other control variables in Χ    include the log of GDP per capita in the home 
(remittance receiving) country and the log of GDP per capita in the main destination (host) country 
for each remittance-recipient country’s emigrants. GDP of the home country is measured on a per 
capita (PPP) basis each year. GDP of the main host country is the GDP per capita (PPP) of the 
country with the largest emigrant population at the beginning of the decade. We also consider a 
squared GDP per capita term to capture any nonlinearities. Remittances may follow an inverted-
U pattern with respect to home country income. This is consistent with the theory of the “migration 
hump” (de Haas 2010). That is, extremely poor countries lack the ability to send migrants abroad, 
and lack the necessary infrastructure (postal service, banking systems, wire transfer agencies, etc.) 
to receive remittances. As incomes rise, these constraints are relaxed and remittances increase. 
Eventually incomes become large enough that migration and remittances become less necessary, 
and remittances decline. 
Several previous studies explore how remittances react not only to the level of economic 
activity, measured by GDP per capita, but also to the business cycle, measured as changes in GDP 
per capita, in the home country. The core question of this line of research is whether remittances 
are used for consumption (altruistic motive) or investment (self-interest motive). If remittances 
fall as GDP increases, then, it is argued, remittances are compensatory in nature. Thus, as incomes 
increase, fewer remittances are needed to subsidize (or cushion) consumption. If, on the other 
hand, remittances increase with GDP, then that is an indicator that remittances are pursuing 
investment opportunities. Empirical evidence on these questions is somewhat mixed. Chami et al. 
(2005), using a sample of 113 countries over a 28 year period, show that remittances tend to decline 
with economic growth, which would indicate remittances are compensatory in nature. On the other 
hand, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and Mundaca (2009) find that remittances tend to be pro-
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cyclical in countries with lower levels of financial development, and are therefore likely pursuing 
investment opportunities. Freund and Spatafora (2008) find that after controlling for transaction 
costs of sending remittances, remittances tend to increase with home country income, thus 
providing further evidence that remittances are pro-cyclical in nature.  Adenutsi (2014), using a 
sample of 36 Sub-Saharan African countries over 30 years, finds that rising income in the home 
country leads to an increase in remittances from permanent migrants but a decrease in remittances 
from temporary migrants. These findings seem to indicate that permanent migrants remit for self-
interest (investment) purposes, while temporary migrants tend to be more altruistic. We account 
for business cycle activity in the home country by including the first difference of home country 
GDP per capita. We also include the first difference of host country GDP per capita to account for 
business cycle effects on emigrant remittances in the main host country. GDP measures in the 
home and host countries are measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. 
As a broad measure of domestic financial development, we also include domestic credit to 
the private sector by banks, measured as a percentage of GDP. The effect of domestic financial 
development on remittance flows is uncertain in the empirical literature. On the one hand, 
remittances can be used to overcome liquidity constraints in the home country, and thus 
remittances tend to decline with financial development (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; 
Mundaca, 2009; Ramirez and Sharma, 2009). On the other hand, increased financial development 
can reduce the transaction costs of sending remittances, thereby increasing remittance flows 
(Freund and Spatafora, 2008; Ezeoha, 2013). Adenutsi (2014) again finds different effects for 
temporary and permanent migrants, with temporary migrants remitting less and permanent 
migrants remitting more as access to bank credit increases.  
 As a measure of human capital we include the share of the origin country population with 
a tertiary education. This measure serves as a proxy for migrants’ earning potential in the host 
country. The expected effect is unknown, ex ante. While more highly educated migrants can earn 
more and thus send more home (Buch and Kuckulenz, 2010), migrants with higher education 
levels may be less likely to return home, thereby reducing the incentive to send remittances 
(Rapoport and Docquier, 2004; Adams, 2009). 
 Another contributing factor to the desire to remit home is the degree of political stability. 
Higgins, et al. (2004) suggest that when political risk rises, migrants that remit for investment 
purposes will become more uncertain in their ability to repatriate investments from their home 
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countries, and become fearful of expropriation, thus reducing the desire to remit. To control for 
political instability we include an index of political violence. We use the Major Episodes of 
Political Violence (MEPV) total acts of violence index, which sums magnitude scores for all 
episodes of civil, ethnic, and international violence and wars occurring within a country. The index 
ranges in value from 0 to 10. A higher value of the index indicates more intense violence, hence 
more instability, and is expected to reduce remittance flows. 
 To control for the altruistic motivation to remit we include the age dependency ratio, 
defined as the share of the population ages 0-14 and 65 and over relative to the working aged (ages 
15-64) population, of the home country (similar to measures in Buch and Kuckulenz, 2010, and 
Adams, 2009). If migrants are altruistic, then we would expect a higher age dependency ratio to 
lead to an increase in remittances. 
 Finally, we include two time dummies to control for periods of financial crises that may 
affect global remittance flows. The first is for the Asian financial crisis during 1997-1998. The 
second is for the Great Recession from 2008-2010. 
 Our data set comprises an unbalanced panel of 118 countries over 1980-2010, with an 
average of 22 observations for each country. We first present the full sample of countries to 
examine the overall implications of FDI inflows for remittance inflows. We then consider the 
possibility that the relationship between remittance flows and FDI may differ across broad income 
classifications. In particular, migrant characteristics may vary systematically across income 
groups, which could, in turn, affect the motivations to remit, thus altering the relationship between 
the two flows. To explore this possibility we separate the countries in our sample into four income 
groups (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high income) along income classifications as 
defined by the World Bank. Since both incomes and definitions of income groups can vary from 
year to year, in order to maintain a stable grouping we define a country’s income group as the 
income group to which they were assigned in the year 2000.9 Appendix Table A1 provides a list 
of countries by income group.  
Summary statistics for the 3 key variables of interest (remittances, FDI flows, and emigrant 
stock) are reported in Table 1 as averages over countries and years, with full summary statistics in 
Appendix Table A2. Table 2 provides correlations between these 3 variables, along with the two 
                                                 
9 Grouping countries by income groups based on 1990 or 2010 income provides similar results regarding 
the relationship between FDI flows and remittances.  Results available upon request. 
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openness measures. We show these summary statistics and correlations for the full sample of 
countries along with countries grouped by income. Remittances as a percentage of GDP range 
from nearly zero (0.00003% for Uruguay in 1983) to as much as 106% (Lesotho in 1982). 
However, 90 percent of the observations on remittances range from 0.03% to 13.1% of GDP. 
Similarly, net inflows of FDI range from -1.9% to 51.9% of GDP with 90 percent of the 
observations between -0.002% and 9.6% of GDP.  There is a great deal of variation across income 
groups with higher remittance shares in the low income and lower-middle income countries.  These 
countries tend to receive less FDI flows as a share of GDP than the upper-middle income countries.  
We also see variation in the raw correlations between FDI and remittances, with a positive 
correlation in all country groups (except the high income group which shows a small negative 
correlation) and the highest correlation for the upper-middle income countries.  We explore these 
correlations further by conditioning our results for the relationship between FDI and remittances 
on the other standard determinants of remittances. 
4. Results 
4.1 Causality 
 Before we can estimate the model in equation (1) we first need to establish that causality 
runs in the direction from FDI to remittances. Table 3 reports results of the causality test outlined 
by equations (2)-(5) for various lag lengths.10 Column 2 presents the Wald statistics for the test 
that FDI causes remittances. Choosing the overall model with the highest R-squared to determine 
optimal lag length indicates three lags is the preferred specification. We can reject the non-
causality null hypothesis at the 5% level. We also note that the non-causality hypothesis is rejected 
for all lag lengths. Column 4 indicates that causality also runs in the direction from remittances to 
FDI. We find, however, a larger R-squared on those regressions in which FDI impacts remittances. 
Thus, while these results demonstrate that remittances can be placed as the dependent variable in 
equation (1), the results also show that it is necessary to control for the potential for reverse 
causality in our model.  We utilize a number of specifications below to address concerns regarding 
reverse causality. 
 
                                                 
10 This test also requires that the variables being tested are stationary. We perform a Fisher-type ADF test 
and reject non-stationarity at the 1% level based on Choi (2001) modified z-statistics of 7.48 and 36.37 
for remittances and FDI, respectively. 
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4.2 Baseline Results 
The main results of our estimation are presented in Table 4a, where we focus on the 
relationship between FDI inflows and remittance inflows to country i. Column 1 reports the naïve 
results of the random effects estimation. The coefficient for FDI is positive and significant. 
Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan LM test indicates that we can reject the null that    = 0 , 
confirming the presence of idiosyncratic effects at the country level. However, as mentioned 
above, the coefficient estimates of FDI are biased due to an endogenous relationship between 
remittances and FDI stemming from reverse causality. Columns 2 and 3 present estimates of the 
IV model, which controls for the endogeneity of FDI, and is thus our preferred specification. We 
show the first-stage results for these two regressions in Table 4b (with corresponding column 
numbers), where the instruments are the lagged values of FDI flows relative to GDP.  We use up 
to 3 lags of FDI as IV variables, using the Sargan-Hansen test to examine the validity of the 
instruments. In column 2 of Table 4a, the p-value corresponding to the Sargan-Hansen test statistic 
is 0.4624, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model is over-identified, 
confirming the validity of our instruments. We also perform a test for weak instruments following 
Stock and Yogo (2005). The Cragg-Donald Wald statistic of 41.68 rejects the null hypothesis of 
weak instruments. Additionally, results of the Hausman test for fixed versus random effects in 
column 2 fail to reject, indicating the random effects model is the appropriate specification.11 
Using the random effects model we are able to add time-invariant regional dummies to the model, 
with the results of this specification presented in column 3. 
The coefficient estimate on FDI in column 2 is significant and positive, and substantially 
larger than the coefficient in column 1, indicating that failing to control for endogeneity leads to 
results that are biased downward. Column 3 of Table 4a introduces a set of regional controls into 
the IV regression. The results are robust to the inclusion of the regional dummies, with a somewhat 
higher coefficient on the FDI measure in column 3 than in column 2. While the dummies for EAP 
(East Asia and the Pacific), LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), and SSA (Sub-Saharan 
Africa) are all negative, only SSA is significant. The fourth regional dummy (MENA for the 
Middle East and North Africa) is positive, but not significant.  Taken together, Table 4a shows 
                                                 
11 Our results are robust to model specification, with fixed effects estimates similar to those shown in 
Table 4a. 
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that remittances and FDI tend to complement each other, suggesting that diasporas seek to 
capitalize on investment opportunities in their home countries.  
Based on previous literature on the determinants of remittance flows across countries, the 
coefficients on the other control variables generally show the expected signs. Countries that are 
more open to trade and capital have higher remittances relative to GDP. Countries with larger 
emigrant stocks have higher remittances as expected. The domestic financial development 
variable, domestic credit to the private sector by banks, is insignificant, which is consistent with 
mixed results in prior literature. An increase in political violence is associated with lower 
remittances, and a more educated labor force is associated with higher remittances. One 
unexpected result is that remittances appear to be negatively associated with the age dependency 
ratio. This finding is similar to that in Buch and Kuckulenz (2010) who argue that a higher number 
of dependents may limit migration and thus remittance flows. Remittance flows appear to have 
been largely unaffected by the Asian financial crisis, but we see a significant increase in 
remittances as a share of GDP during the Great Recession. This result, however, is more likely a 
result of GDP declines, rather than increases in remittances. In fact, global remittances fell slightly 
in 2009 (World Bank, 2011). 
For the income control variables in  Χ   , we find that remittances are positively related to 
the level of GDP per capita and negatively related to squared GDP per capita, indicating that 
remittances follow an inverted U pattern with respect to home country income. However, the 
coefficients are only significant for the squared terms. We also find that remittances are positively 
related to the change in GDP per capita in columns 1-3.  That is, remittance flows increase when 
the economy is growing, perhaps indicative of remittances flowing toward investment 
opportunities. However, results from the first stage, presented in Table 4b, indicate that the change 
in GDP per capita is also a significant predictor of FDI flows, along with prior FDI flows and 
openness. Thus, the pro-cyclical behavior of remittances found in previous literature (as in Freund 
and Spatafora, 2008) may emanate from the relationship between remittances and FDI.  The 
international community appears to respond to increases in home country GDP by increasing FDI, 
with migrants then following suit to increase remittance flows. 
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We have explored different combinations of these control variables (in particular leaving 
out the squared GDP per capita term and the first-differenced GDP per capita term).12 The results 
for the FDI variables are robust to these different combinations of these control variables, 
indicating that the relationship between remittances and FDI flows are not sensitive to these 
inclusions. However, since FDI and GDP are closely related, we explore this relationship further 
by also controlling for potential endogeneity between these two variables.  
Column 4 of Table 4a presents results of an IV model in which we instrument for both FDI 
and GDP variables in the first stage, adding lagged values of GDP and GDP2 as instruments 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Our results are robust to this change, with our coefficient for FDI changing 
only slightly from 0.335 to 0.337.13 
Taken together, the coefficient estimates in Table 4a indicate that the relationship between 
FDI and remittance flows is positive and in the range of 0.32 to 0.34. Given the log-log nature of 
the regressions, these estimates are interpreted as elasticities. Consequently, a 10% rise in FDI 
flows relative to GDP to country i is associated with a 3.2% to 3.4% increase in remittances relative 
to GDP.  To put this in context, the median per capita income in our sample is $5,603 (PPP). If we 
assume that this country has average shares of remittances (3.4%) and FDI (2.9%), then per capita 
remittances and FDI would be approximately $191 and $162, respectively. For this median 
country, our results indicate that a 10% increase in FDI corresponds to approximately a $20 
increase in FDI per capita, which translates into a $5.52 increase in remittances per capita. 
4.3 Income Groups 
The baseline evidence presented above indicates that remittances are positively related to 
FDI, perhaps indicating that remittances are being used for investment purposes.  The degree to 
which migrants may alter their remitting patterns with respect to investment opportunities, as 
measured by FDI flows, is likely to vary with the level of economic development in their home 
countries.  Thus, we consider four income groups based on World Bank classifications: low 
income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, and high income countries.  As noted above, 
                                                 
12 These benchmark results are also robust to a larger sample (up to 157 countries) obtained by leaving 
out the controls on education, political violence, and age dependency. The results are also robust to the 
inclusion of time fixed effects in place of the two global shock variables.  
13 Including a domestic interest rate (relative to LIBOR) as an instrument for FDI provides similar results 
to those presented in Table 4a, with a coefficient on FDI of 0.387. We do not include this variable in the 
results presented due to a substantial loss of observations. 
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we use the year 2000 classifications to group countries as shown in Appendix Table A1.  
Alternative years provide similar results. 
Results of the IV Random Effects model, instrumenting for both FDI and GDP, by income 
groups are reported in Table 5.14 Low income countries show the largest remittance response to 
FDI inflows, with a 10% increase in FDI relative to GDP leading to a 7.19% increase in remittance 
flows relative to GDP. For lower-middle income countries, this response is smaller but still 
significantly positive, with a 10% increase in FDI inflows relative to GDP leading to a 2.65% 
increase in remittances relative to GDP. In upper-middle income countries the relationship 
between FDI and remittances is not significantly different from zero. The relationship is again 
significant in high income countries, and relatively high, with a 10% increase in FDI as a share of 
GDP leading to a 4% increase in remittances as a share of GDP.  
At first glance, the coefficient estimates in Table 4a appear to indicate a U-shaped pattern 
in the relationship between FDI and remittances across income groups (i.e., that FDI and 
remittances are complements in the lower income and high income countries but not in the middle 
income countries). However, since these coefficients measure relative percentage changes, much 
of this pattern arises due to variation in the base levels and relative importance of remittances and 
FDI across income groups. For example, in low income countries the average remittance-to-GDP 
ratio is much higher than that of high income countries (5.97% compared to 0.76%).  Consider a 
country with the median income within each income group.  Suppose that median country has the 
average remittance-to-GDP ratio and the average FDI-to-GDP ratio for that income group. The 
level of remittances then translates into per capita remittances of $77 in the low income group and 
$193 in the high income group. Similarly, the level of FDI translates into per capita FDI of $34 in 
the low income group and $718 in the high income group.  
To further explore these differences we calculate the effect of a 10% increase in FDI on 
remittances in dollar terms for the median country in each income group assuming mean shares of 
                                                 
14 We do not report the first-stage regression results for the estimation in Table 5 to conserve on space.  
The first-stage regressions use lagged FDI flows and lagged GDP and GDP2 as instruments for FDI, GDP, 
and GDP2. The reported Wald statistic rejects weak instruments at the 5% level with a maximal relative 
bias of 20% for low income countries, 10% for high income countries, and 5% for middle income 
countries.  When we use only lagged FDI as an instrument in the first stage, then the Stock and Yogo 
(2005) critical values for rejecting weak instruments at the 5% level indicate a maximal relative bias of 
10% for low income countries and 5% for the other country groups.  In all cases, the coefficient values 
remain the same with either set of instrumental variables. 
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remittances and FDI.  We then normalize that to a $1 increase in per capita FDI. We find that for 
the median low income country a $1 increase in FDI per capita corresponds to a $1.62 increase in 
remittances per capita. As investment opportunities arise and FDI flows increase into the country, 
the diaspora also seize on these opportunities by increasing their remittances at a rate of roughly 
one and a half times that of other international investors. Given that prior research has found that 
remittances are often invested in microenterprise (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007) and that 
remittances can serve as substitutes for bank finance in the absence of formal credit markets (Coon, 
2014) it is not surprising that the complementarity between remittances and FDI is strongest among 
low income countries. In addition to further highlighting the importance of remittances for 
investment in low income countries, this result also shows that policies aimed at attracting FDI 
can also spur investment by the diaspora community. 
The migrant response to changes in FDI is much smaller for the other groups. For the 
median lower-middle income country a $1 increase in FDI per capita corresponds to a $0.38 
increase in remittances per capita. There is no significant change for upper-middle income 
countries, and the median high income country sees remittances per capita increase by $0.11 for 
each $1 increase in FDI. While we cannot identify directly what is driving this variation using the 
current data, it is possible that much of the response is due to variation in the types of investments 
being undertaken by migrants and the availability of alternative sources of capital. For example, 
an investor in a lower-middle income country may be able to secure a bank loan to start a small 
business by using remittance income as a down payment. In such a case the change in remittances 
need not be as large as if the entire enterprise were being financed through remittances. Similarly, 
migrants from high income countries may prefer to invest their savings in portfolio capital, rather 
than starting businesses in their home countries. If this is the case, then these purchases would not 
necessarily be recorded as remittance flows. While we leave the testing of these subtle sources of 
variation to further research, it is important to note that although the relationship between 
remittances and FDI does change across income groups, at no point do we find evidence that the 
two capital flows serve as substitutes. Thus, the variation provides evidence of the strength of the 
complementarity between the two flows.  
There is also interesting variation in the results for the control variables across income 
groups. First, capital account openness appears to be significant only for middle income countries. 
Trade openness is positive and significant for all income groups except the high income group 
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where it is insignificant. Remittances are positively associated with GDP for low income countries 
and negatively associated with GDP for high income countries, consistent with the theory of the 
migration hump. The age dependency ratio has a positive impact on remittances to lower-middle 
income countries, but a negative impact on upper-middle income countries. Low income countries 
with a larger share of labor with tertiary education receive fewer remittances, while more education 
increases remittances in upper-middle and high income countries. 
4.4 Official Development Assistance 
Recent literature has examined how remittances may relate to other capital flows, such as 
Official Development Assistant (ODA). Broad correlations, as examined by Buch and Kuckulenz 
(2009), show that remittances and official capital flows are positively related.  Kpodar and Le Goff 
(2011) show that remittances may increase aid dependency in general unless remittances are used 
for human or physical capital accumulation. We include in the benchmark regression a measure of 
Official Development Assistance capital flows, which are gifts of aid or assistance to the 
governments of country i, and often include strict guidelines on their use or disbursement. Our 
focus is not directly on how ODA may impact remittances since remittances are flowing directly 
to households, but in how they may impact the relationship between FDI and remittances. We 
might imagine, however, that ODA flows would affect remittances if both are predominantly 
flowing to poorer countries. Table 6 provides results for the low income, lower-middle income, 
and upper-middle income country groups.15  The high income group is excluded since these 
countries are not generally the recipients of ODA capital flows.  Table 6 shows that ODA flows 
(as a share of GDP) are negatively associated with remittance flows (as a share of GDP) in low 
income countries, but are not a significant determinant of remittances in middle income 
countries.16  The relationship between FDI flows and remittances remains the same as before, with 
low income and lower-middle income countries showing a positive and significant relationship 
between FDI flows and remittances, with similar size coefficients to those reported in Table 5.  
Overall, the inclusion of ODA does not change our main conclusion that FDI inflows positively 
impact remittance inflows. 
                                                 
15 We do not report the first-stage regression results for the estimation in Table 6 to conserve on space.  
The first-stage regressions use lagged FDI flows, lagged GDP and GDP2 measures, and lagged ODA 
flows as instruments for FDI, GDP, GDP2, and ODA. 
16 The negative relationship between ODA and remittances is similar to that in Mallaye and Yogo (2011) 
who only examine low income countries. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our focus on the relationship between aggregate FDI and aggregate remittance flows 
across a wide range of countries indicate a complementary relationship between FDI and 
remittance flows. We interpret this relationship as suggestive of the desire among migrants to 
invest in their home countries. While there is a clear positive relationship between these two flows, 
the estimated coefficients show that remittance flows are inelastic with respect to FDI flows. 
Overall, we find that a 10% increase in FDI inflows corresponds to a 3.6% increase in remittances. 
We find the effect (measured in terms of either elasticity or levels) to be much larger among low 
income countries, where remittance flows typically exceed FDI flows as a share of GDP on 
average. The effects are smaller for lower-middle income countries and high income countries, 
and insignificant for upper-middle income countries. Although the measured elasticity is larger in 
high income countries than lower-middle income countries, the level changes in remittances are 
larger for a given increase in FDI in the lower-middle income countries than in high income 
countries.  This is consistent with the fact that remittances make up a larger share of GDP relative 
to FDI in the low and lower-middle income countries. 
Further research focusing on the individual uses of remittances and how these choices are 
affected by both the access to domestic credit and to international capital flows, such as FDI, would 
be useful from a development perspective. Our aggregate data cannot show the individual choices 
of emigrants but are suggestive that the different types of capital flows are related. In particular, 
the remittance flows here are positively related to FDI flows and to measures of openness in both 
trade and financial flows. We do not find any evidence that FDI flows crowd out or substitute 
directly for remittance flows. Instead, we show that these two types of capital are complements as 
remittances increase with greater FDI inflows even after controlling for such factors as openness 
and economic growth. While we cannot disentangle the potential motivations for the 
complementary nature, the results suggest that both foreign investors and migrants respond to 
investment opportunities in the home country.  FDI may also create additional investment 
opportunities for migrant investors. Thus, from a policy prescription standpoint, increases in 
remittance flows are likely to accompany policies that maintain continued openness that attract 
FDI. Given prior evidence that remittance flows tend to be less volatile than other capital flows 
(Ratha, 2003), remittances could provide a more stable form of capital that remains in a country 
when other types of capital are withdrawn. Consequently, policies to help direct both remittances 
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and FDI flows into domestic investment could prove fruitful from a development perspective, 
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Table 1: Main Summary Statistics 1980-2010 (averages over countries and years)  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All Countries      
Remittances (% of GDP) 2607 3.39 7.91 0.00003 106.48 
FDI (% of GDP) 2607 2.91 4.23 -16.06 51.90 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 2607 6.34 6.51 0.09 47.71 
 
Low Income   
   
Remittances (% of GDP) 763 5.97 13.00 0.00 106.48 
FDI (% of GDP) 763 2.63 4.45 -4.03 35.23 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 763 5.04 5.00 0.09 27.76 
 
Lower-Middle Income    
  
Remittances (% of GDP) 759 4.46 5.11 0.001 25.10 
FDI (% of GDP) 759 3.08 3.59 -3.28 39.81 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 759 7.20 8.01 0.28 47.71 
 
Upper-Middle Income   
   
Remittances (% of GDP) 491 0.90 1.02 0.00003 6.94 
FDI (% of GDP) 491 3.20 4.67 -16.06 51.90 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 491 5.55 5.00 0.25 24.23 
 
High Income   
   
Remittances (% of GDP) 594 0.76 1.17 0.0001 9.12 
FDI (% of GDP) 594 2.83 4.30 -6.71 36.43 
Emigrant Stock (% of population) 594 7.56 6.81 0.52 29.53 
 













0.11 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.01 
Corr(Remittances, emigrant 
stock) 
0.30 0.52 0.48 0.31 0.43 
Corr(Remittances, KAOPEN) 
 
-0.06 0.06 0.26 0.22 -0.42 
Corr(Remittances, Trade 
Openness) 
0.28 0.54 0.24 0.23 0.09 
Corr(FDI, emigrant stock) 
 
0.29 0.28 0.37 0.31 0.25 
Corr(FDI, KAOPEN) 
 
0.21 0.18 0.24 0.39 0.20 
Corr(FDI, Trade Openness) 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.34 0.53 
FDI is FDI inflows as a share of GDP, Remittances are remittance inflows as a share of GDP, and emigrant stock is the 
number of immigrants (relative to population) at the beginning of the decade.  
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Table 3: Granger causality test Wald statistics 
Lags (k) Ha: FDI causes Remittances R2 Ha: Remittances cause FDI R2 
1 7.33*** 0.916 21.23*** 0.148 
2 4.35** 0.927 8.08*** 0.210 
3 2.71** 0.933 3.34** 0.267 
4 2.85** 0.933 2.69** 0.258 




Table 4a: Random Effects Panel Estimates; Dependent Variable: Ln[Remittances (% of GDP)] 
 Random Effects GLS 2SGLS Random Effects IV 
 (1) (2)a (3)a (4)b 
Ln[FDI (% of GDP)] 0.021* 0.323*** 0.335*** 0.337*** 
 (0.013) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) 
KAOPENt-1 0.120*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Trade Opennesst-1 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Domestic Credit 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Emigrant Stock 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln[GDP per capita] 1.155 0.901 0.715 0.708 
 (0.780) (0.865) (0.905) (0.929) 
Ln[(GDP per capita)2] -0.129*** -0.112** -0.105* -0.108* 
 (0.047) (0.052) (0.054) (0.055) 
Δ(GDP per capita) 2.556*** 1.373** 1.362** c 
 (0.505) (0.600) (0.605)  
Ln[Main Host GDP per capita] 0.083 0.076 0.065 0.066 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.058) (0.058) 
Δ(Main Host GDP per capita) -0.033 -0.036 -0.028 -0.017 
 (0.083) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) 
Asian Financial Crisis -0.055 -0.097 -0.103 -0.112 
 (0.067) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) 
Great Recession 0.300*** 0.276*** 0.292*** 0.265*** 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) 
Age Dependency Ratio -0.022*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Political Violence Index -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.065*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Share of Labor with Tertiary Education 0.050*** 0.027* 0.026* 0.028* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)   -0.445 -0.461 
   (0.413) (0.410) 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)   -0.493 -0.519 
   (0.370) (0.367) 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)   -0.658* -0.698* 
   (0.391) (0.388) 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)   0.733 0.726 
   (0.457) (0.454) 
Constant -1.369 -0.707 0.681 1.041 
 (3.330) (3.678) (3.890) (3.984) 
N 2607 2453 2453 2453 
χ2 501.908 434.377 436.880 430.393 
p(x>χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Breusch-Pagan LM Statistic p(x>χ2) 0.000    
Hausman Test FE vs. RE p(x>χ2)  0.5994   
Sargan-Hansen Statistic p(x>χ2)  0.4624 0.4558 0.4017 
Cragg-Donald Wald Statistic  41.68 40.23 24.10 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; aInstrumented Variables: Ln[FDI (% of GDP)]; 
bInstrumented Variables: Ln[FDI (% of GDP)], Ln[GDP per capita], Ln[(GDP per capita)2]; cΔ(GDP per capita) 
dropped due to collinearity in first stage.   
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Table 4b: First-Stage Results, Random Effects Panel Estimates 
 (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Ln[FDI (% of 
GDP)] 
Ln[FDI (% of 
GDP)] 






KAOPENt-1 0.043 0.037 0.044 0.002** 0.044*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.001) (0.015) 
Trade Opennesst-1 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.0003*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.00005) (0.001) 
Domestic Credit -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) 
Emigrant Stock -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0003) (0.006) 
Ln[GDP per capita] 1.175 1.462    
 (1.183) (1.224)    
Ln[(GDP per capita)2] -0.075 -0.087    
 (0.071) (0.073)    
∆(GDP per capita) 2.972*** 2.957***    
 (0.787) (0.787)    
Ln[Main Host GDP per 
capita] 
-0.017 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.001 
(0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.002) (0.034) 
Δ(Main Host GDP per 
capita) 
0.016 -0.002 0.022 0.009*** 0.151*** 
(0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.003) (0.054) 
Asian Financial Crisis 0.234** 0.238** 0.222** -0.006** -0.098** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.003) (0.044) 
Great Recession -0.114 -0.145 -0.198** -0.020*** -0.382*** 
 (0.098) (0.099) (0.097) (0.002) (0.042) 
Age Dependency Ratio -0.025** -0.026** -0.030*** -0.001*** -0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) 
Political Violence Index 0.002 0.008 0.003 -0.002** -0.024* 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.001) (0.013) 
Share of Labor with 
Tertiary Education 
0.037* 0.039** 0.044** 0.002*** 0.033*** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.000) (0.008) 
East Asia and Pacific 
(EAP) 
 0.047 0.001 -0.012 -0.204 
 (0.565) (0.561) (0.014) (0.239) 
Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) 
 0.499 0.430 -0.020 -0.356* 
 (0.503) (0.499) (0.013) (0.213) 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  1.120** 1.030** -0.026** -0.341 
 (0.518) (0.514) (0.013) (0.219) 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 
 0.103 0.077 -0.006 -0.120 
 (0.626) (0.622) (0.016) (0.265) 
Ln[FDI (% of GDP)]t-1 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.110*** -0.001* -0.007 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.001) (0.008) 
Ln[FDI (% of GDP)]t-2 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.001 0.013 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.001) (0.008) 
Ln[FDI (% of GDP)]t-3 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.000009 -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.0005) (0.008) 
Ln[GDP per capita]t-1   1.611 1.028*** 1.143** 
   (1.204) (0.031) (0.513) 
Ln[(GDP per capita)2]t-1   -0.102 -0.004** 0.902*** 
   (0.072) (0.002) (0.031) 
 30
Constant -3.086 -5.125 -4.971 0.133 -0.863 
 (5.050) (5.273) (5.176) (0.131) (2.207) 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Column numbers correspond to those in Table 4a. 
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Table 5: 2SGLS Random Effects IV Panel Estimates, by Income Group 
Dependent Variable: Ln[Remittances (% of GDP)];  
Instrumented Variables: Ln[FDI(% of GDP)], Ln[GDP per capita], Ln[(GDP per capita)2] 









Ln[FDI (% of GDP)] 0.719*** 0.265*** -0.070 0.404*** 
 (0.193) (0.090) (0.108) (0.085) 
Ln[GDP per capita] 9.779*** 3.840 -0.127 -45.896*** 
 (3.690) (2.429) (8.090) (8.058) 
Ln[(GDP per capita)2] -0.758*** -0.245 -0.068 2.187*** 
 (0.259) (0.150) (0.436) (0.396) 
KAOPENt-1 0.110 0.341*** 0.166*** -0.057 
 (0.084) (0.041) (0.053) (0.040) 
Trade Opennesst-1 0.006* 0.004* 0.013*** 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Domestic Credit 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Emigrant Stock 0.062*** 0.042*** 0.119*** 0.000 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.032) (0.019) 
Ln[Main Host GDP per capita] 0.219*** 0.797*** -0.160* 0.188 
 (0.079) (0.207) (0.085) (0.155) 
Δ(Main Host GDP per capita) -0.151 -0.873*** 0.057 -0.276 
 (0.276) (0.299) (0.128) (0.274) 
Asian Financial Crisis -0.333 -0.163 0.049 0.008 
 (0.292) (0.124) (0.163) (0.097) 
Great Recession 0.589** -0.054 0.122 0.179* 
 (0.263) (0.132) (0.166) (0.105) 
Age Dependency Ratio -0.001 0.014* -0.031*** -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) 
Political Violence Index 0.017 -0.089** 0.064 0.147*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.088) (0.057) 
Share of Labor with Tertiary 
Education 
-0.089** 0.023 0.068** 0.041** 
 (0.041) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018) 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) -2.642*** -0.488 0.113 -0.238 
 (0.414) (0.622) (1.273) (0.523) 
Latin America and Caribbean  -0.572 -0.398 -0.743  
(LAC) (0.499) (0.502) (0.805)  
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) -2.372*** 1.210 0.531  
 (0.388) (1.026) (1.003)  










Constant -31.323** -23.996** 7.283 237.616*** 
 (13.254) (10.283) (37.928) (41.222) 
N 740 716 465 555 
χ2 302.001 280.684 129.327 137.907 
p(x>χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan-Hansen Statistic p(x>χ2) 0.716 0.520 0.499 0.307 
Cragg-Donald Wald Statistic 6.56c 20.35a 17.99a 9.10b 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Rejects weak instruments based on Stock and Yogo 
(2005) critical values for maximal relative bias of a 5%, b 10%, and c 20%. 
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Table 6: 2SGLS Random Effects IV Panel Estimates, by Income Group  
Dependent Variable: Ln[Remittances (% of GDP)]; Instrumented Variables: Ln[FDI (% of GDP)], 
Ln[ODA (% of GDP)], Ln[GDP per capita], Ln[(GDP per capita)2] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Low Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle Income 
Ln[FDI (% of GDP)] 0.752*** 0.257*** -0.146 
 (0.196) (0.092) (0.160) 
Ln[GDP per capita] 9.636*** 10.338*** 12.776 
 (3.731) (2.741) (10.232) 
Ln[(GDP per capita)2] -0.793*** -0.647*** -0.789 
 (0.262) (0.171) (0.557) 
Ln[ODA (% of GDP)] -0.509*** 0.144 0.056 
 (0.140) (0.104) (0.132) 
KAOPENt-1 0.128 0.304*** 0.130** 
 (0.085) (0.042) (0.060) 
Trade Opennesst-1 0.009** 0.001 0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Domestic Credit 0.003 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Emigrant Stock 0.082*** 0.052*** 0.111*** 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.041) 
Ln[Main Host GDP per capita] 0.236*** 0.646*** -0.129 
 (0.080) (0.206) (0.089) 
Δ(Main Host GDP per capita) -0.143 -0.574* 0.054 
 (0.279) (0.303) (0.133) 
Asian Financial Crisis -0.393 -0.132 0.126 
 (0.296) (0.123) (0.169) 
Great Recession 0.618** -0.083 0.109 
 (0.265) (0.140) (0.219) 
Age Dependency Ratio 0.011 -0.000 -0.040*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
Political Violence Index -0.033 -0.115*** 0.091 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.102) 
Share of Labor with Tertiary Education -0.056 0.012 0.095** 
 (0.043) (0.025) (0.038) 
East Asia and Pacific (EAP) -2.307*** -0.041 0.575 
 (0.427) (0.635) (1.314) 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) 0.023 0.005 -0.286 
 (0.530) (0.513) (0.826) 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) -2.115*** 1.768* 1.103 
 (0.396) (1.047) (1.021) 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) -0.016 1.175** -0.636 
 (0.770) (0.556) (1.367) 
Constant -29.206** -47.787*** -50.330 
 (13.416) (11.254) (47.125) 
N 740 686 420 
χ2 306.626 274.470 107.341 
p(x>χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan-Hansen Statistic p(x>χ2) 0.704 0.541 0.331 
Cragg-Donald Wald Statistica 5.17 14.74 2.21 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; a Stock and Yogo (2005) only provide critical values 
for up to three endogenous variables. Extrapolating from their Table 5.1, the test statistics reported here appear to be 
sufficient to reject weak instruments at the 5% level for a maximal relative bias level of 20% and 5% for low and lower-






Table A1: List of Countries by Income Classification 
Low Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle Income High Income 
Armenia Mauritania Albania Kazakhstan Argentina Australia 
Bangladesh Moldova Algeria Latvia Botswana Austria 
Benin Mongolia Bolivia Lithuania Brazil Belgium 
Burundi Mozambique Bulgaria Morocco Chile Cyprus 
Cameroon Nepal Cambodia Namibia Costa Rica Denmark 
Central African Republic Nicaragua China Papua New Guinea Croatia Finland 
Congo Niger Colombia Paraguay Czech Republic France 
Cote d’Ivoire Pakistan Dominican Republic Peru Estonia Germany 
Gambia Rwanda Ecuador Philippines Gabon Greece 
Ghana Senegal Egypt Romania Hungary Ireland 
Haiti Sierra Leone El Salvador Russia Korea Israel 
India Sudan Fiji Sri Lanka Libya Italy 
Indonesia Tajikistan Guatemala Swaziland Malaysia Japan 
Kenya Tanzania Guyana Syria Mauritius Netherlands 
Kyrgyz Republic  Togo Honduras Thailand Mexico New Zealand 
Lao Uganda Iran Tunisia Panama Norway 
Lesotho Ukraine Jordan  Poland Portugal 
Liberia Vietnam   Saudi Arabia Slovenia 
Mali Yemen   Slovak Republic Spain 
    South Africa Sweden 
    Trinidad and Tobago Switzerland 
    Turkey United Kingdom 
    Uruguay United States 




Table A2: Additional Summary Statistics 1980-2010 (averages over countries and years)  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Low Income      
KAOPEN 761 -0.47 1.27 -1.86 2.46 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 762 65.80 36.38 6.32 209.87 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 763 29.18 25.66 -20.87 248.90 
GDP per capita (PPP) 763 1524 920 325 6734 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 763 9337 12001 510 43636 
Age Dependency Ratio 763 84.34 16.31 36.36 113.71 
Political Violence Index 763 1.08 2.16 0 10 
Share of Labor with Tertiary Education 763 2.26 3.67 0.07 24.55 
Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) 763 10.66 11.34 0.05 147.17 
Lower-Middle Income      
KAOPEN 759 -0.19 1.38 -1.86 2.46 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 756 79.38 37.74 22.48 280.36 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 759 51.46 35.58 -12.62 269.58 
GDP per capita (PPP) 759 4853 2662 814 17600 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 759 25146 12292 823 49952 
Age Dependency Ratio 759 68.71 16.66 34.52 107.75 
Political Violence Index 759 0.98 1.86 0 9 
Share of Labor with Tertiary Education 759 4.63 4.34 0 24.74 
Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) 729 3.26 4.08 -0.07 35.32 
Upper-Middle Income      
KAOPEN 491 0.28 1.48 -1.86 2.46 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 491 84.57 46.10 12.35 220.41 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 491 55.52 43.63 -72.99 212.92 
GDP per capita (PPP) 491 11198 4263 3611 26774 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 491 27354 12294 501 52170 
Age Dependency Ratio 491 59.46 13.52 37.61 96.22 
Political Violence Index 491 0.26 0.83 0 5 
Share of Labor with Tertiary Education 491 5.64 4.44 0.16 30.04 
Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) 445 0.63 1.37 -0.07 9.97 
High Income      
KAOPEN 594 1.63 1.22 -1.86 2.46 
Trade Openness [(EX+IM)/GDP] 594 68.86 32.48 15.92 183.62 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 594 120.70 56.53 22.90 328.99 
GDP per capita (PPP) 594 26182 6844 11350 48403 
Main Host GDP per capita (PPP) 594 28700 7187 7902 46906 
Age Dependency Ratio 594 50.76 4.86 41.52 71.61 
Political Violence Index 594 0.24 0.92 0 7 
Share of Labor with Tertiary Education 594 10.77 5.22 1.36 26.80 
 
